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Abstract 
In the wake of  several high-profile natural disasters, crowding effects between public relief  
and private investments in disaster preparedness have recently attracted renewed attention. 
We examine how non-hypothetical self-insurance behavior by households responds to 
variations in public investments in relief  capabilities based on a large disaster preparedness 
survey (n = 19,071) conducted in Japan in 2012. The preparedness measure used is 
emergency drinking water storage, defining a setting in which (i) government provides 
in-kind, rather than cash, relief  and (ii) the crowding effect observed is more apt to be total, 
rather than partial. In contrast to much of  the literature studying crowding effects of  cash 
relief, there is little evidence for crowding out in emergency drinking water, with an upper 
bound of  2 percent at the intensive margin.  
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1. Introduction 
Modern societies remain vulnerable to disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis. Such 
low-probability high-impact events are associated with substantial losses in human welfare. The magnitude 
of  human welfare losses can be mitigated significantly by investments into emergency preparedness, 
however (Kahn 2005). In fact, even moderate levels of  preparedness in the form of  emergency supplies 
can have substantial impacts on morbidity and mortality during catastrophic events (Conolly et al. 2004; 
Tanaka et al. 1999). As a result, many countries attempt to attain high levels of  domestic preparedness by 
combining initiatives to encourage individual preparedness at the household level with a variety of  
governmental and non-governmental efforts to provide emergency relief  when natural disasters occur.  
The present paper contributes to a growing empirical literature that analyzes the relationship between 
public and individual disaster preparedness, much of  it motivated by the common observation that the 
average household is insufficiently prepared (e.g. DIEM 2010). Understanding more about this 
relationship is important for both researchers and policy-makers: If  publicly-provided emergency relief  
negatively affects households’ choice of  preparedness, this would provide additional empirical support for 
the ‘crowding-out’ effect of  public interventions postulated in the seminal paper by Ehrlich and Becker 
(1972). If  present, crowding-out can have significant impact on the effectiveness of  public preparedness 
efforts since public investments have no or only fractional impact on the overall level of  preparedness.  
The presence and scale of  a crowding out effect has been the subject of  several empirical studies that 
draw on evidence from a variety of  natural disasters. Various studies find evidence in line with 
3 
 
crowding-out (e.g. Kunreuther 2006, Botzen et al. 2009, Kousky 2013, Brunette et al. 2013) and highlight 
the possible causal channels through which crowding out can operate. One channel is the simple 
mechanism of risk compensation (Ehrlich and Becker 1972): Fully informed and perfectly rational 
households may want to avoid excessive preparedness in a setting where public measures reduce expected 
damages from a catastrophic event (Botzen et al. 2009). Such risk compensation can be, but need not be 
welfare-reducing. If preparedness can be provided more cheaply by government, then private investments 
should be reduced in response to public investments under social efficiency considerations.  
Less ambiguous in welfare terms is the channel of ‘charity hazard’ (Browne and Hoyt 2000): This 
concept, closely related to moral hazard, refers to the strategic reduction of damage-limiting prevention by 
households when governments already offer an efficient level of preparedness. Charity hazard captures the 
decision by private households to reduce preparedness below the efficient level because they know that 
government cannot credibly commit to not providing additional damage-relief in the event of a catastrophe. 
Such strategic behavior is welfare-distorting and means, as Buchanan (1975) pointed out, that 
governments face a ‘Samaritan’s dilemma’ in emergency relief  (Raschky and Schwindt 2016).  
A third channel is perception bias: Private households may overestimate the effectiveness of public 
interventions in providing disaster relief and, as a consequence, lead households to underestimate the 
damages from potential disasters and to under-invest in market-based insurance and self-protection 
(Kunreuther, 1996). The three channels do not appear to be always operative at detectable magnitudes, 
however: Despite similar settings, other studies fail to identify crowding out in their data (Kousky et al. 
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2013, Koerth et al. 2013) or find that there is considerable heterogeneity across subjects (Osberghaus 
2015). This points to important subtleties in the mechanisms and diagnostics of crowding out.  
Against the existing evidence on crowding out, the present paper examines a particular disaster 
preparedness setting, namely private and public investments in emergency drinking water (EDW) supply 
in Japan for the year 2012. The amount of EDW stored publicly and privately is a valuable measure for 
disaster preparedness since its availability has a dramatic impact on mortality and morbidity rates following 
a catastrophic event (Watson et al. 2007).1 This choice of a setting enables the paper to make at least two 
contributions. The first is that it provides an opportunity to examine in-kind relief, as opposed to cash 
relief, as the publicly provided insurance good. In many circumstances, governments provide in-kind relief, 
such as emergency shelter, food, and drinking water, for populations afflicted by natural catastrophes. 
Almost all the evidence on crowding-out, however, comes from settings in which government offers cash 
relief (Raschky and Schwindt 2016). The form of relief may not be inconsequential in terms of crowding 
effects, in particular when markets are incomplete,2.but also for behavioral reasons. The extent to which 
results from cash relief carry over to in-kind relief is an open question. The second contribution of the 
paper is that its results on crowding are largely immune to a key challenge raised by Ehrlich and Becker in 
their seminal 1972 paper: In equilibrium, they argue, there should be no arbitrage left between publicly 
provided risk reduction on the one hand and across the three options of market insurance, self-insurance, 
                                                   
1 In developed countries, the contribution of  EDW to morbidity and mortality reduction mainly relates to water safety rather than 
water availability. In a post-disaster environment, disruption of  access to uncontaminated drinking water ranks as a primary 
concern since populations quickly become vulnerable to water-borne diseases.  
2 When capital markets are incomplete and households are liquidity constrained, cash relief  could arguable induce crowding 
effects simply by allowing households to monetize illiquid assets.  
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and self-protection on the other. Ideally, therefore, the researcher would be able to observe choices across 
all three options in order to evaluate the efficiency and welfare effects of these choices before and after the 
exogenous change in publicly provided risk reduction. In practice, however, the researcher will typically 
observe only a subset of these choices, for example the change in households’ demand for market 
insurance (e.g. Raschky et al. 2013, Kousky et al. 2013). While such data can inform statements on the 
partial impact of increased public intervention on market insurance, a total assessment of whether crowding 
out has occurred requires a comprehensive picture of the household’s response to increased public 
intervention also across self-insurance and self-protection. The finding by Osberghaus (2015) that the 
overall vulnerability of households to flooding events is the result of a complex interplay between public 
flood protection, the private demand for flooding insurance, and private flood mitigation measures is a 
case in point. The present setting allows the total effect to be estimated with considerable confidence 
because two out of the three alternative options mentioned by Ehrlich and Becker are not available in the 
case of EDW: Investment in EDW has no close substitutes and can privately only be provided on a 
cost-effective basis through self-insurance3 and not through market insurance or self-protection.4 In a 
setting with such a restriction of options, the response of private EDW storage to an increase in public 
EDW supply can therefore confidently be expected to provide a close approximation to the total impact. 
Also, since public and private EDWS provide a perfect substitute, namely drinking water, the setting 
allows crowding effects to be assessed on a liter-for-liter basis, making the effects stark.  
                                                   
3 Conceptually, self-insurance is the most appropriate definition for behavior in which households store EDW in their own home.  
4 Self-protection could – theoretically – take the shape of  activities such as sinking private wells or purchasing water filtration 
equipment. Such measures are typically either not available (wells) or not cost-effective (water filtration). 
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To test for the presence and scale of  crowding out of  private emergency preparedness by public 
preparedness measures, we use unique household survey data from 19,071 households in Japan in 2012. 
The location, timing, and focus of  the survey are significant: Japan is a country with areas that are exposed 
to a high risk of  natural disasters and a recent history thereof. The population is deeply aware of  the 
presence of  natural hazards and public measures intended to manage the resultant vulnerabilities. Japan is 
also a country in which the private cost of  specific preparedness by ensuring adequate EDW storage is 
high. Internationally exceptional residential dwelling density (Keirstead and Shah 2012) and resultant 
housing costs (Kanemoto 1997) lead to a high opportunity cost of  sacrificing residential space for 
emergency water storage, which amounts to around 24 liters for a typical family of  four.  
The timing of  the survey is also significant: In 2012, the central coastal regions of  Japan’s main island 
constituted a typical post-disaster environment in the wake of  the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, the 
subsequent tsunami event, and the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi. As a result, the topic of  the 
survey had cognitive salience and the survey population was generally well informed about disaster relief, 
public preparedness etc. The key source of  variation in our dataset comes from the different levels of  
local public preparedness in the form of  investments into public EDW storage. While there are national 
recommendations on how much EDW a community should store, communities vary considerably in their 
preparedness. Across Japan’s 47 prefectures, public EDW ranges from 01l per person to more than 65l.  
A natural concern is the direction of causality that links public and private preparedness in EDW 
storage. Prima facie, variations in public preparedness could conceivably be driven by officials being 
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informed about private preparedness and adjusting preparedness appropriately, rather than the other way 
around. While this possibility can no longer be excluded after 2014, when the first systematic assessment 
of private preparedness at the local level was conducted, at the time of our own survey such information is 
not considered to have been generally available. This makes reverse causality less likely for Japan in 2012.  
Against this empirical background, we examine the presence of a negative statistical relationship 
between public and private EDW storage through multivariate regression analysis, using control variables 
to account for well-known determinants of self-insurance such as risk exposure, disaster experience, and 
other socio-demographic characteristics. The headline results confirm the presence of statistically 
significant, but unsubstantial crowding-out effects of governmental intervention on private households’ 
disaster preparedness. At the extensive margin, there is not effect of additional EDW storage by 
government on the propensity that the average household will decide not to store any EDW. At the 
intensive margin, we find that among those households that store a positive amount of EDW, but less 
than the officially recommended amount, every additional liter per capita (lpc) of public EDW supply 
reduces private EDW storage by around 0.02lpc. The effect is highly robust to the inclusion of controls, 
estimation methods, and thresholds. It implies a crowding-out of approximately 2 percent. An 
examination of the covariates shows that the extensive and intensive margin decisions broadly respond to 
the same factors. But there are also some important differences. For example, households’ EDW 
provision is highly insensitive to the number of dependent members (children and elderlies in need of 
medical support). In other words, the private storage of EDW of households with and without dependent 
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members is essentially the same. This points to the potential gains from EDW relief targeted at 
households with dependents. 
In the following Section 2, we provide an overview of the existing literature. In Sections 3 and 4, we 
describe our data and estimation method. In Section 5, we present and interpret our estimation results, 
and in Section 6, we provide concluding remarks. 
2. Related Literature 
The theoretical study of  a crowding out effect of  public insurance on self-insurance goes back to at 
least the early seventies when Isaac Ehrlich and Gary Becker published their seminal study on the 
interaction between market insurance and self-insurance (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). Their insights were 
subsequently applied to the study of  natural disaster preparedness (e.g. Lewis and Nickerson 1989, 
Quiggin 1992, Crocker and Shogren 1999, Zehaie 2005; Mahmud and Hassan 2014), lending theoretical 
support to the notion that there is an inverse relationship between public relief  efforts and private 
preparedness for natural disaster risks.  
The empirical literature on the topic has adopted a variety of  research strategies in order to test for the 
presence, direction, and strength of  crowding effects of  government-provided disaster relief. A number 
of  studies conduct surveys that elicit hypothetical willingness to pay for insurance against the backdrop of  
expectations about government assistance. Asseldonk et al. (2002) examine demand for crop insurance 
among Dutch farmers and find evidence for crowding out. So do Botzen et al. (2009) in a survey of  
Dutch homeowners that examines their willingness to provide self-protection through domestic mitigation 
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measures. Botzen and van den Bergh (2012a,b) support this finding with similar results on flood insurance 
demand in a large sample of  around 1000 Dutch homeowners. Raschky et al. (2013) survey around 500 
households in Germany and Austria in a post-disaster period to elicit WTP for flood insurance and also 
find evidence for crowding out by governmental disaster relief, with additional nuances on account of  
differences in the certainty and volume of  relief  between the two countries. The consistent empirical 
evidence that hypothetical WTP for insurance negatively varies with expected government relief  is also 
supported by related evidence derived under controlled conditions: Brunette et al. (2013) conduct a 
framed laboratory experiment with forest owners in which different treatments vary the nature and 
amount of  “public support” in the case of  an adverse forest event. They find that such relief  reduces the 
demand for insurance, irrespective of  whether the uncertainty is of  a classic risk type or involves 
ambiguity. Turner et al. (2014) conduct experiments in post-disaster Pakistan with subjects affected and 
not affected by the flood event and find that having received government assistance for major disaster 
recovery reduces demand for insurance in the experiment.  
Despite the clear evidence for crowding out from surveys that elicit hypothetical WTP and from a 
laboratory study, empirical studies that rely on actual insurance data do not always arrive at the same 
conclusion. Browne and Hoyt (2000) examine the frequency of  flood-insured households in different US 
states and find evidence for crowding in of  federal disaster assistance on private flood insurance at the 
state-level. Petrolia et al. (2013) confirm this finding based on individual-level survey data from the US 
Gulf  Coast and Florida’s Atlantic Coast: The propensity of  holding a flood policy increases with 
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perceived eligibility for federal disaster assistance. Kousky et al. (2013) question the validity of  these 
findings on the grounds of  endogeneity problems. They propose an identification strategy based on that 
fact that federal disaster assistance has a politically discretionary component. Using political contestability 
(‘swing state’) as an instrument and individual flood contract data, Kousky et al. find a crowding out effect 
at the order to $6 for every $1 increase in federal aid grants, but no effect for government loans. 
Osberghaus (2015) examines German household survey data on individual flood event mitigation efforts 
in the wake of large-scale floods in 2013. This study does not find evidence for the hypothesis that 
expected relief payments by government crowd out private investments in preparedness.5  
In light of the results in the literature, the empirical support of crowding out effect therefore is not 
clear-cut once we step beyond the domain of hypothetical WTP measures. The present study presents 
such a step: It adds to the current evidence base by bringing new insights from a large-scale survey about 
self-insurance to bear on the question of  crowding. In this, the study relies on self-reported actual 
behavior rather than on hypothetical behavior and therefore adds evidence to the literature in that area 
where the presence of  crowding out is most in question.  
Without exception, investigations into the presence of a crowding out effect control for the presence of 
additional drivers of households’ disaster preparedness for which the researcher needs to control. There is 
general agreement on risk exposure, disaster experience, risk management posture as well as 
socio-demographic characteristics as key variables of interest. These drivers have been identified and 
                                                   
5 Raschky et al. (2008) and Neumayer et al. (2013) show that crowding effects can also operate at the international level (see also 
Cohen and Werker, 2008). 
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assessed both the papers interested in crowding effects (see above) as well as papers that choose not 
investigate this causal link (e.g. Donahue et al. 2013 or Koerth et al. 2013).  
Table 1: Empirical findings on significance and direction of drivers of preparedness 
Driver of  preparedness Estimated 
direction 
Study 
Public preparedness 
Positive Brown and Hoyte (2000); Petrolia et al. (2013). 
Insignificant Osberghaus (2015). 
Negative Asseldonk et al. (2002); Botzen et al (2009); Botzen and van 
den Bergh (2012a,b); Raschky et al. (2013); Kousky et. al 
(2013); Turner (2014) 
Risk exposure 
Positive Donahue et al. (2013) ; Osberghaus (2015); Botzen et al (2009); 
Raschky et al. 2013; Asseldonk et al. (2002)6 
Insignificant Asseldonk et al. (2002)7 
Negative Koerth et al. (2013) 
Disaster experience 
Positive 
 
Donahue et al. (2013) ; Koerth et al (2010) ; Brown and Hoyt 
(2000); Osberghaus (2015) ; Turner et al. (2014) ; Asseldonk et 
al. (2002)8; Raschky et al. (2013)9 
Insignificant Botzen et al. (2009) ; Asseldonk et al. (2002)10; Raschky et al. 
(2013)11 
Risk management 
posture 
(implicit risk premium) 
Positive Osberghaus (2015);Donahue et al. (2013); Petrolia et al. (2013) 
Insignificant Raschky et al (2013) ; Asseldonk et al (2002) 
Income 
Positive Osberghaus (2015); Raschky et al. (2013); Browne and Hoyt 
(2000) 
Insignificant Botzen et al. (2009); Turner et al. (2014) 
Education 
Positive Botzen et al. (2009); Donahue et al. (2013) 
Insignificant Osberghaus (2015); Asseldonk et al. (2002) 
Children present Insignificant Osberghaus (2015); Petrolia et al. (2013) 
As table 1 illustrates, there is considerable, but not universal agreement on the importance of these 
                                                   
6 The positive result applies to the extensive margin estimation in a double-hurdle model.  
7 The insignificant finding applies to the intensive margin estimation in a double-hurdle model. 
8 Result for the extensive margin in a double-hurdle model.  
9 Result for the effect of  damage size. 
10 Result for the intensive margin in a double-hurdle model. 
11 Result for the frequency of  damage.  
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drivers and their direction of impact. The same drivers play a role despite inevitable differences in the 
empirical implementation of the underlying concepts given the available data for each empirical study and 
the different methodological strategies. Apart from public preparedness, for almost all of the identified 
drivers, there is consistent evidence of a nonnegative relationship between the level of the variable and the 
estimated direction of how it impacts on preparedness. This convergence in estimated effects provides a 
set of predictions on what patterns to expect in any new dataset, such as the one underlying the present 
paper. 
3. Empirical strategy, data, and descriptive results 
The empirical strategy adopted in this paper focuses on EDW for three reasons: First, immediate access to 
EDW is essential in a post-disaster environment since the consumption of  contaminated drinking water is 
a leading cause of  post-disaster morbidity and mortality. Second, EDW is a generic good, with 
government relief  a very close to a perfect substitute for private provision. Third, private EWD provision 
is costly due to the high opportunity cost of  storage space in Japan. Exploiting this particular setting, we 
assess the impact of  local governments’ preparedness with respect to EDWS on household-level 
preparedness. The particular setting also contains important corroborating institutional details that allows 
us to argue that the direction of  causality is not in question. Local governments in Japan, like governments 
elsewhere, are subject to long planning horizons and a high degree of  institutional and procedural inertia 
(Donahue 2011). This limits the responsiveness of  local government to intertemporal variations in 
disaster preparedness by private households. The most important piece of  evidence is, however, the fact 
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that the first study to inform local governments about citizen preparedness following the 2011 Tohoku disaster 
was only conducted in 2014 (Nakayachi et.al 2015). Even before that, local governments’ supply side orientation 
in disaster relief  has meant that households' risk perception or patterns of  preparedness were rarely investigated 
in Japan. This is, in fact, not unusual: Also in countries such as the US, officials are typically vaguely aware of  the 
true level of  disaster preparedness in the population, and regional or local variations within these levels 
(Donahue 2011).12 Japanese households, on the other hand, have traditionally received information about how 
their local governments reinforce disaster preparedness, a trend that has increased through the use of  social 
media in recent years (GoJ 2012). Most prefectures distribute information leaflets on disaster preparedness to 
households and information on EDW provision by prefectures is explicitly available through the Internet.13 This 
leads to a situation in which households are much better able to condition their individual levels of  preparedness 
on what they know about the government’s efforts rather than the other way around.  
 Household data on disaster preparedness comes from a large-scale survey, the 2012 Survey of 
Individual-Level Preparedness for Natural Disaster. The purpose of  the survey was to generate a 
comprehensive picture of  disaster preparedness among Japanese households. For the purposes of this 
study, disaster preparedness of each household is measured by reference to the amount of EDW that the 
household should – given its size - store according to official guidelines and the amount of EDW that the 
household actually stores. Households are expected to store independently enough water to survive the 
first 72 hours after a disaster. The officially recommended EDW amount is 6 liters of  water per 
                                                   
12 Donahue et al (2013) also find that there are fundamental differences between officials’ perceptions of  citizens’ preparedness 
and citizens’ perception of  own preparedness. 
13 One English-language example is provided here: http://www.city.hyuga.miyazaki.jp/display.php?cont=160418152455 (accessed 
on March 10, 2017) 
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household member, with appropriate reductions for younger HH members.14 This allows a first rough 
categorization of  households according to preparedness status. We will refer to a household as unprepared 
if the amount of EDW it stores is zero. A household will be categorized as underprepared if there is a 
positive amount of EDW stored, but less than recommended by official guidelines. Finally, prepared 
households store an amount of EDW that fulfils or exceeds official guidelines and therefore have no 
shortfall.  
In addition to information on preparedness, the survey also collected data that relate to those 
determinants of  disaster preparedness that the literature has established as important drivers (see section 
2). These are variables that measure risk experience and risk attitudes, in addition to a number of  
socioeconomic variables. On risk experience, households are asked on a yes/no basis whether they have 
personally been affected by a disaster in the past (EX-disaster), whether they have personal experience of  
seeking refuge in an emergency shelter (EX-shelter), whether they were personally affected by the 1995 
Kobe earthquake (EX-Kobe). For experience of  the 2011 Tohoku earthquake (EX-Tohoku), we compare 
the residence location of  a household at the time of  the earthquake with its impact zone and code for 
experience if  the residence was located there. On risk attitude, the survey collected yes/no responses on 
whether the household head had participated in a disaster drill in the last five years (training) or considered 
himself  generally compliant with official guidelines and health recommendations (compliance). 
Socio-demographic variables include the population density of  the prefecture in which the household is 
                                                   
14 For a HH member of  13 years of  age or older, the amount is 6 liters. For the age group between 8 and 12 years, the supply is 
set at 4.5 liters and at 3 liters for ages below 8 years. Given the age composition of  a HH, there is a specific recommended level 
of  EDWS (in liters) composed of  the sum of  individual EDW needs. So a family with two adults, child aged 10 and another aged 
6 would have to maintain a total supply of  19.5l EDW in storage continuously in order to comply with the recommendations. 
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located (density) as well as household income (income), household size, years of  secondary education 
(education), number of  children under 5 years of  age (children), and the number of  elderlies above 64 years 
of  age that require medical care (elderlies).  
Data on public preparedness and on households’ risk exposure comes from local governments’ natural 
disaster aid data available from the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA), which is a part of  the 
Japan Ministry of  Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC). FDMA provides disaggregated annual data 
on the provision of  drinking water and other emergence commodities. With the survey conducted in 2012, 
we use data from 2011 on the basis that citizens’ decision making is based on the information about the 
previous year. FDMA also provides data on the number of  FDMA officers allocated by the national 
government to each community and on the city-level budget expenditures for the mitigation and recovery 
from disaster. We choose to proxy risk exposure of  a household through two variables: One variable 
captures past exposure through the cumulative expenditures on disaster recovery per square kilometer by 
the relevant prefecture since YEAR (expenditure). The other variable measures officially expected future 
exposure measured through the number of  professional emergency workers per one thousand inhabitants 
allocated by the national government to the community in which the household is located (professionals). 
The survey sample consisted of 19,071 households from across Japan. The sampling frame was designed 
to randomly select respondents while preserving the population composition of Japan’s population 
between the ages 20 to 69 in key socio-demographic dimensions. We designed and outsourced the survey 
to a marketing company (Nikkei Research). The survey was web-based and administered nationwide.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Shortfall  
Gap between HH EDW and 
official guideline (in liter) 
19071 14.12 14.15 -25.5 49.5 
Public EDW 
Public EDW per person in 
prefecture (in liter) 
19071 0.817 5.882 0.011 65.45 
Expenditure 
Past prefecture government 
expenditure on disaster recovery 
(in k¥/capita) 
19071 0.000 0.002 0 0.130 
Professionals 
Number of professionals in 
community-based emergency 
department service 
19071 0.312 0.705 0 14.02 
EX-Disaster 
Personal experience of disaster, 
except 2011 Tohoku and 1995 
Kobe incidents (dummy) 
19071 0.167 0.373 0 1 
EX-shelter 
Personal experience of  
emergency shelter (dummy) 
19071 0.102 0.303 0 1 
EX-Tohoku 
Residence in 2011 located in 
Tohoku earthquake impact zone 
(dummy) 
19071 0.025 0.156 0 1 
EX-Kobe 
Personal experience of 1995 
Kobe earthquake (dummy) 
19071 0.052 0.223 0 1 
Training 
Participation in disaster drill in 
last five years (dummy) 
19071 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Compliance 
Subjective perception of rule 
compliance 
19071 0.328 0.470 0 1 
Density 
Population density of prefecture 
(population/km2) 
19,071 2,031 2,196 65.42 6,288 
Education  Years of secondary education  19071 5.142 2.659 0 10 
Income Monthly HH Income (in k¥) 19000 640.81 378.39 200 2000 
Children Number of small children (< 5a) 19071 0.147 0.438 0 4 
Elderlies 
Number of elderlies (> 64a) 
requiring care 
19071 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Table 2 shows the structure of  respondents and a number of  key descriptive results. A number of  
features stand out. For example, the average household have a shortfall of  about 14 liters below the 
official EDW storage guidelines. This is in line with previous international findings that most households 
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are insufficiently prepared (compare also DIEM 2010). Categorizing households by preparedness status, 
we find that 6,691 out of  19,071 households that answered the question stated that they do not store any 
EDW. This puts the share of  unprepared households at 35.1 percent. The share of  underprepared 
households, i.e. those that store some EDW, but have a shortfall relative to the official guidelines, lies at 
48.5 percent (9,245 out of  19071). Only 16.4 percent of  households (3,135 out of  19,071) have no 
shortfall and can therefore properly be described as “prepared”. 
Public supply of EDW per head in Japan in 2012 was around one liter (0.8l) on average, but with 
considerable variation. Some households are located in prefectures in which there is essentially no public 
EDW stored (0.01l) while other household can count on access to more than 65 liters of EDW per head. 
We exploit this variation in the next section to understand how private households respond to this 
variation in public EDW storage. 
4. Hypotheses and Estimation Method 
Theory and previous empirical evidence allow both for the possibility that private households’ EDW 
storage decision is unaffected by public EDW storage levels and for the possibility that it responds 
negatively to higher levels of  public EDW storage. We apply two complementary models to determine 
which of  the two possibilities is supported by our Japanese survey evidence.  
Model 1 examines the factors that determine the preparedness status of  a household, and in particular 
the role of  public EDW storage in determining the status. We distinguish three types of  status, i.e. 
whether the household is unprepared, underprepared, or fully prepared. We adopt, throughout, the null 
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hypothesis that no crowding takes place, placing the burden of  proof  on crowding.  
Hypothesis 1 (order effects): A higher per capita supply of  EDW by government does not affect the likelihood 
that households are un- and underprepared.  
We test hypothesis 1 using an ordered probit model, with public EDW supply as an explanatory variable. 
Using an indicator variable that increases with the preparedness status, evidence of  crowding out requires 
a negative sign to be recovered for the coefficient of  public EDW supply.  
Model 2 considers the possibility that a crowding-out effect could operate either at the extensive and 
the intensive margin of  the households’ decision making process, or both. The extensive margin effect of  
public EDW storage affects a household’s choice whether to stay unprepared or to prepare at least to 
some extent. The intensive margin effect of  public EDW storage affects, for the latter households, the 
their choice of  how much EDW to store. The presence and scale of  these margins is of  obvious interest 
to policy-makers, particularly in the case of  EDWS. Households crowded out at the extensive margin are 
particularly vulnerable in the case of  a disaster, leading to a disproportionate mortality and morbidity 
impact. The intensive margin mostly affects the time pressure under which government needs to bring 
disaster relief  to the affected population. The empirical validity of  these hypotheses is therefore of  
considerable significance.  
For model 2, we therefore test two hypotheses. The first of  the two considers the extensive margin.  
Hypothesis 2 (extensive margin): Everything else equal, a household’s decision whether to store a positive amount 
of  EDW is unaffected by variations in the locally available public EDW supply.  
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The third hypothesis examines the extent to which the level of  EDW storage decisions varies with the 
level of  public EDW supplies.  
Hypothesis 3 (intensive margin): Everything else equal, a household’s shortfall in EDW storage is unaffected by 
variations in the locally available public EDW supply.  
We test both hypotheses through a hurdle model. This means that hypothesis 2 is tested by conducting a 
probit estimation of  preparedness for the entire survey population, with public EDW supply as the main 
explanatory variable. The dependent variable for the probit is the household’s preparedness status, which 
is set to 1 for prepared and underprepared households and to zero for unprepared households. The sign 
and significance of  the coefficient estimate for public EDW storage then forms the basis for a basic 
rejection test on hypothesis 2 and for statements on the strength of  the extensive margin effect.  
In a second step, we examine hypothesis 3 by testing how variations in public EDW supply affect the 
level of  preparedness among underprepared and prepared households. The natural object of  interest here 
are underprepared households: Unlike prepared households, underprepared households subject to 
crowding out have immediate implications for expected mortality and morbidity of  catastrophic events. A 
first test of  hypothesis 3 consists of  an OLS regression with the level of  shortfall in EDW preparedness 
as the dependent variable and, again, public supply of  EDW per head of  population as the main 
explanatory variable.  
As controls, we include in the tests for both hypotheses variables that capture, individually and jointly, a 
household’s risk exposure, disaster experience, risk management attitude, and socioeconomic 
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characteristics. For the variables that proxy for risk exposure, disaster experience, and risk management 
attitude, economic intuition and previous empirical evidence lead to the general prediction that they 
correlate positively with the propensity to prepare and negatively with the degree of  shortfall in 
preparedness. We also include controls for income, education, and the number of  dependent children and 
elderly people in the household.  
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Ordered probit 
Table 3 reports the results of  the ordered probit estimation, with the three level of  preparedness status, 
ranked from unprepared to underprepared to prepared, as the dependent variable. There are six model 
specifications. The most basic specification (1) examines the unconditional effect of  public EDW storage 
on preparedness status. Further specifications add risk exposure (2), risk experience (3), risk management 
attitudes (4), and demographic characteristics as separate covariates. Specification (6) provides a run of  the 
ordered probit model with all covariates included.  
Table 3: Effects after ordered probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public EDW -0.00389*** -0.00371*** -0.00416*** -0.00326** -0.00114 -0.000448 
 (0.00150) (0.00140) (0.00160) (0.00142) (0.00102) (0.000991) 
EX_Disaster   0.147***   0.135*** 
   (0.0313)   (0.0256) 
EX_Shelter   0.100***   0.0741*** 
   (0.0272)   (0.0220) 
EX_Kobe   -0.0612   0.0455 
   (0.0715)   (0.0554) 
EX_Tohoku   0.130   0.330*** 
   (0.104)   (0.0821) 
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Expenditure  1.871    -10.85 
  (14.13)    (9.123) 
Professionals  -0.141***    -0.0712*** 
  (0.0332)    (0.0169) 
Training    0.313***  0.304*** 
    (0.0314)  (0.0323) 
Compliance    0.262***  0.241*** 
    (0.0168)  (0.0186) 
Density     6.25e-05*** 6.70e-05*** 
     (1.72e-05) (1.56e-05) 
High school     0.0990*** 0.0887*** 
     (0.0332) (0.0331) 
Tertiary education     0.142*** 0.135*** 
     (0.0355) (0.0354) 
Graduate education     0.105** 0.0917** 
     (0.0463) (0.0462) 
Income     0.000252*** 0.000209*** 
     (2.22e-05) (2.27e-05) 
One Child     -0.0317 0.00480 
     (0.0259) (0.0255) 
Two Children     -0.146*** -0.0898** 
     (0.0448) (0.0451) 
Three Children     -0.436*** -0.421*** 
     (0.124) (0.126) 
Four Children     -4.788*** -4.662*** 
     (0.223) (0.223) 
Elderlies     0.000215 -0.0268 
     (0.0452) (0.0465) 
Constant cut1 -0.386*** -0.286*** -0.348*** -0.253*** -0.0786 0.127* 
 (0.0719) (0.0626) (0.0797) (0.0730) (0.0660) (0.0676) 
Constant cut2 0.974*** 1.092*** 1.017*** 1.129*** 1.293*** 1.541*** 
 (0.0566) (0.0537) (0.0663) (0.0582) (0.0530) (0.0625) 
       
Observations 19,071 19,071 19,071 19,071 19,000 19,000 
Note: Dependent variable is the preparedness status of  the household (unprepared = 1, underprepared = 2, prepared = 3). Standard errors 
clustered at prefecture level. Significance levels are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Under hypothesis 1, we expect the coefficient estimate associated with public EDW supply to be 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Hypothesis 1 cannot be fully rejected. The coefficient is 
consistently negative across all six specifications and significantly different from zero and negative in four 
of  the six specifications. This can be interpreted to imply that a higher amount of  public EDW storage 
decreases the likelihood that a household will be found in a higher state of  preparedness. The effect is, on 
the other hand, quantitatively small, even when significant: The marginal effects on the odds ratio never 
exceeds 0.0002 at the means of  each preparedness status. The coefficient also becomes insignificant in 
specifications (5) and (6), i.e. once demographic controls are included. This leads to result 1.  
 Result 1 (order effects): The hypothesis that higher public EDW storage does not impact on the preparedness status 
of  a household cannot be rejected. Even when statistically significant, the effect is of  negligible magnitude.  
On the covariates, we find statistically robust evidence for a positive role of  disaster experience, education, 
income, risk management attitudes, and population density on preparedness status, and some evidence for 
a negative role of  dependent children in preparedness. The fit of  the ordered probit model is adequate. 
The deviation between the estimated and observed proportion of  unprepared households is less than 0.5 
percent (34.67 vs. 35.10), but the proportion of  underprepared households is somewhat overestimated 
(50.0 percent estimated vs. 48.5 percent observed).  
5.2. Hurdle model 
Tables 4 and 5 report the regression results for the extensive margin (table 4) and intensive margin 
(table 5) for a number of  different specifications. Table 4 shows six columns providing marginal effects at 
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the sample mean based on a probit model, with standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. As in 
table 1, column (1) reports the results for a univariate specification of  crowding without additional 
controls and columns (2) through (5) specifications with additional covariates for risk exposure (2), risk 
experience (3), risk management attitudes (4), and sociodemographic characteristics of  the household (5). 
The last column (6) estimates all effects jointly.  
The first observation about the table entries for table 4 concerns the degree of  robustness of  the 
coefficient estimates and significance levels: Across model specifications, the signs of  the sample mean 
effects remain consistent, except for the coefficient on post-disaster expenditure, and magnitudes are 
stable for most, but not all variables. The second observation concerns the coefficient associated with the 
main explanatory variable, namely the amount of  public EDW per head of  population. As in model 1 
reported in table 3, this coefficient is consistently negative for all specifications and remains statistically 
significant (at around 0.15) for specifications (1) through (4).Once demographic controls are included, 
however, the effect becomes insignificant. This is summarized in result 2.  
 Result 2 (extensive margin): The hypothesis that higher public EDW storage does not impact on a household’s 
propensity to store a positive amount of  EDW cannot be rejected. Even when statistically significant, the effect never exceeds 
negligible magnitudes: At the sample mean, one additional liter per capita of  public EDW supply increases the likelihood 
that a household will be unprepared by at most 0.17 percent.  
Result 2 summarizes the evidence for a quantitatively small trade-off  for the public disaster 
preparedness: Higher public investments in preparedness increase the likelihood that households do not  
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Table 4: Marginal effects after probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public EDW -0.00162*** -0.00156*** -0.00173*** -0.00136** -0.000437 -0.000179 
 (0.000583) (0.000551) (0.000613) (0.000550) (0.000409) (0.000389) 
EX_Disaster   0.0645***   0.0616*** 
   (0.0129)   (0.0114) 
EX_Shelter   0.0434***   0.0315*** 
   (0.0126)   (0.0112) 
EX_Kobe   -0.0227   0.0112 
   (0.0288)   (0.0219) 
EX_Tohoku   0.0548   0.122*** 
   (0.0445)   (0.0336) 
Expenditure  0.947    -2.828 
  (5.344)    (3.703) 
Professionals  -0.0559***    -0.0294*** 
  (0.0120)    (0.00660) 
Training    0.144***  0.138*** 
    (0.0146)  (0.0127) 
Compliance    0.108***  0.0981*** 
    (0.00764)  (0.00765) 
Density     2.61e-05*** 2.76e-05*** 
     (7.48e-06) (6.74e-06) 
High school     0.0510*** 0.0473*** 
     (0.0135) (0.0136) 
Tertiary education     0.0810*** 0.0788*** 
     (0.0149) (0.0149) 
Graduate education     0.0446*** 0.0397** 
     (0.0172) (0.0175) 
Income     0.000177*** 0.000159*** 
     (1.19e-05) (1.21e-05) 
One Child     0.0302** 0.0464*** 
     (0.0139) (0.0137) 
Two Children     -0.00541 0.0204 
     (0.0182) (0.0175) 
Three Children     -0.0945 -0.0928 
     (0.0687) (0.0685) 
Elderlies     0.0528*** 0.0437** 
     (0.0163) (0.0170) 
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Observations 19,071 19,071 19,071 19,071 19,000 19,000 
Note: Dependent variable is the decision to store some positive amount of  EDW (dummy = 1). Coefficients are marginal effects at sample 
mean. Standard errors clustered at prefecture level. Significance levels are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
store any amount of  EDW at most by a rate of  0.17 percent per liter per head at the sample mean. To 
put this finding in perspective, by storing one additional liter per head, the community induces at worst 
slightly more than 0.17 percent of  households to incur an EDW shortfall of  6lpc (the recommended 
amount), implying an additional burden of  only 0.01 lpc or one percent on public supply.  
The estimated effects for the altenative explanatory variables reaffirm the ordered probit results and 
add to existing evidence on drivers of  preparedness: The variables capturing risk exposure are insignificant 
(for expenditure) or negatively related (emergency staff) to preparedness, thus supporting findings by 
Koerth et al. (2013) and Asseldonk et al. (2002), respectively. Risk experience relates weakly positively to 
the decision to prepare, with the exception of  experience of  the 1995 Kobe disaster, an event more than 
20 years in the past.15 A greater affinity to risk management, expressed through active participation in 
drills and a general compliance with rules and recommendations, increases the likelihood of  EDW storage 
(Donauhue et al. 2013 and Petrolia et al. 2013), as do income (Osberghaus 2015, Raschky et al. 2013) and 
education (Botzen et al. 2009; Donahue et al. 2013). The presence of  one child and of  an elderly care 
recipient has a positive effect on whether to store some EDW.  
Table 5 shows seven columns providing OLS estimates for the crowing effect at the intensive margin, 
with columns (1) through (6) using the private EDW storage of  underprepared households as the 
                                                   
15 This is in line with previous papers that have noted the relatively rapid decline in the impact of  disaster experience on 
preparedness (Botzen et al. 2009; Kunreuther et al. 1985). Note that we do not control for the age of  the head of  the household, 
which could be expected to mitigate the decline in preparedness (Osberghaus 2015).  
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dependent variable. Standard errors are again clustered at the prefecture level. As above for the extensive 
margin, column 1 reports the results for a univariate model and columns (2) through (5) report on 
specifications with alternative explanatory variables. Column (6) estimates all effects jointly. Column (7) 
differs from the other specifications: Here we report on the results of  the multivariate model on the 
subsample of  prepared households, i.e. those storing at least the recommend amount of  EDW. This allows 
us to examine crowding effects in this particular subgroup and compare it to underprepared households.  
We find robust coefficient estimate signs and, in part, magnitudes, as well as significance levels across 
model specifications (1) through (6). In contrast to preparedness status and the extensive margin decision 
whether to store some amount of  EDW, the intensive margin decision of  how much to deviate from 
recommended EDW storage shows evidence of  a positive statistical association with public EDW storage. 
Higher public EDW is associated with a greater shortfall of  EDW stored by the household. Depending 
on the specificication The magnitude of  crowding out lies between 0.018 and 0.027lpc for every liter per 
capita stored by the public. In line with the preparedness status and extensive margin models, the effect is 
small, here around 2 percent. It is also apparent from column (7) that the subsample of  prepared 
households responds in a fundamentally different way to the same conditions, with some coefficient signs 
reversed for public EDW, components of  risk experience, and risk exposure. We summarize as follows. 
Result 3: We find clear and statistically significant evidence of  crowding out of  public EDW supply on the level of  
EDW that underprepared households store. On average, one additional liter per capita of  public EDW supply decreases 
the amount an underprepared household stores by roughly .02 liter per capita.  
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Putting result 3 differently, 98 percent of  public investment in EDW add to the preparedness of  
underprepared households in net terms. Column (7) makes clear that prepared households’ EDW storage 
does not vary in a substantive way with public EDW supply. Prepared households’ EDW storage shows 
some evidence consistent with crowding in, but at even lower magnitude than the crowding out for 
underprepared households (0.6 percent).  
An inspection of  the covariates reveals both similarities and differences between extensive and intensive 
margin responses. Risk exposure fully and risk experience mostly play very similar roles at both margins. 
Likewise, the risk management variable of  participating in training increases the likelihood of  being 
prepared, but leads to a lower level of  preparedness, as does income. The most consequential dimension is 
the presence of  dependent household members. While their presence does not affect the propensity to 
prepare in statistically significant way, having children in a household increase the shortfall in EDW 
storage by between 1.4lpc for the first and around 4lpc for subsequent children. Every elderly person with 
care needs is associated with a shortfall of  around 5lpc. The shortfalls for these groups are at least half  of  
their requirements of  3lpc and 6lpc, respectively. This means that the private EDW preparedness fails to 
reflect most of  the EDW requirements of  these two groups. One explanation for this finding is that such 
households face higher opportunity costs of  EDW preparedness than the average due to less disposable 
income and less space.  
 Combining the extensive and the intensive margin effect, we find that increasing public EDW supply 
affects only the intensive margin in a statistically significant, but quantitatively insubstantial way: It raises 
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the burden on public EDW supply by around 2 percent on account of  underprepared households storing 
less EDW. At worst, the extensive margin effect adds 1 percent. In other words, while present, the 
crowding out effect is negligible in quantitative terms. 
 
Table 5: OLS estimates for private EDW shortfall 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Public EDW 0.0233*** 0.0225*** 0.0274*** 0.0248*** 0.0178*** 0.0210*** -0.00666** 
 (0.00554) (0.00515) (0.00608) (0.00522) (0.00434) (0.00411) (0.00295) 
EX_Disaster   -0.875**   -0.650 -0.439 
   (0.404)   (0.425) (0.532) 
EX_Shelter   -0.575   -0.726* 0.422 
   (0.372)   (0.393) (0.425) 
EX_Kobe   1.274***   0.715*** 0.299 
   (0.364)   (0.264) (0.227) 
EX_Tohoku   0.0601   -0.700* -0.413 
   (0.466)   (0.383) (0.481) 
Expenditure   -51.47    32.11 -18.84 
  (75.61)    (59.02) (108.1) 
Professionals  0.559***    0.291* -0.0767 
  (0.170)    (0.160) (0.203) 
Training    1.285***  0.949*** -0.0872 
    (0.293)  (0.275) (0.181) 
Compliance    -0.752***  -0.905*** -0.566** 
    (0.190)  (0.187) (0.212) 
Density     -0.000321*** -0.000323*** -8.70e-05 
     (7.12e-05) (7.44e-05) (5.53e-05) 
High school     0.270 0.262 0.322 
     (0.426) (0.426) (0.483) 
Tertiary Education     -0.440 -0.435 0.584 
     (0.391) (0.390) (0.392) 
Graduate Education     -1.729*** -1.704*** 0.304 
     (0.411) (0.408) (0.454) 
Income     0.00462*** 0.00463*** 0.00117*** 
     (0.000286) (0.000283) (0.000298) 
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One Child     1.394*** 1.314** 0.698* 
     (0.512) (0.513) (0.400) 
Two Children     4.094*** 4.088*** 3.048*** 
     (0.513) (0.515) (0.527) 
Three Children     4.663** 4.309**  
     (2.089) (2.051)  
Elderlies     5.220*** 5.187*** 1.302** 
     (0.421) (0.412) (0.589) 
Constant 15.43*** 15.93*** 15.61*** 15.44*** 12.18*** 12.93*** -8.482*** 
 (0.272) (0.258) (0.298) (0.265) (0.415) (0.470) (0.419) 
        
Observations 9,245 9,245 9,245 9,245 9,214 9,214 3,115 
R-squared 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.055 0.066 0.015 
F 17.62 12.14 . 26.92 77.67 . . 
Note: Dependent variable is the amount of  shortfall of  a household with positive EDW storage below the 
recommended amount in liters. Standard errors clustered at prefecture level. Significance levels are * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
In light of  the existing evidence on crowding effects and the determinants of  HH preparedness, the 
quantitatively small crowding out effect documented in tables 3 through 5 deserves two comments. One 
comment is our results raise the possibility that crowding effects may in fact depend on the type of  relief  
government offers. Most papers find evidence of  crowding out (see table 1), but that evidence derives 
from settings in which governments offer cash relief. One explanation for why our findings differ from 
most the existing literature is that in-kind relief  has different effects from cash relief. If  so, this would 
have important ramifications for the design of  relief  policies. The second comment is that the specific 
EDW setting makes it plausible that the small crowing effect is a measure of  the total, rather than partial, 
impact of  public insurance on self-insurance. This is because either private storage or reliance on public 
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storage effectively exhaust a household’s options for managing EDW risks in the event of  a catastrophe.16 
The estimated joint crowding effects of  2 percent of  public EDW supply therefore provides an unusually 
close approximation of  the total crowding effect of  public intervention. 
5.2. Robustness checks 
Given that insignificant crowding effects of  public on private preparedness are the exception rather 
than the rule in the literature, we conduct a number of  robustness checks. One simple check is to 
aggregate the data up to the prefecture level and rerun the regression exercises at the two margins, one for 
the share of  households that store some amount of  EDW and one for the amount of  shortfall. In 
appendix A, we report the results of  these two first robustness check, which are consistent with the 
headline results.  
A second check is to see whether the results are sensitive to the specific categorization of  households 
into preparedness status on the basis of  the official EDW requirements. This categorization is relevant for 
distinguishing under-prepared and prepared households. The categorization of  unprepared households, 
on the other hand, hinges on an entirely objective criterion, namely that the household does not to store 
any EDW. We therefore recode households preparedness status in two ways, once setting a 25 percent 
higher threshold of  EDW storage, once setting a 25 percent lower threshold. We then rerun model 1 on 
the recoded dataset. The results of  this robustness check are presented in appendix B. As is evident, 
coefficient estimates are very close to those estimated when the official EDW requirements are used for 
                                                   
16 There may be a small role for insurance through neighbors and other social networks. However, disaster entail highly correlated 
risk events that render risk sharing ineffective. 
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determining preparedness status and there are no changes in significance.  
6. Conclusion 
In light of  the recent evidence on how important disaster preparedness is for limiting morbidity and 
mortality impacts of  catastrophes, the relationship between public disaster preparedness and private 
preparedness intervention has attracted renewed attention. Over the last few years, this has led to a 
literature that has unearthed important evidence for the presence of  a crowding out effect, but also 
pointed to important subtleties in the presence and scale of  the effect. These subtleties in part reflect 
empirical challenges identified already at the inception of  the crowing literature. 
The present paper exploited an empirical opportunity created by a unique dataset from a disaster 
preparedness survey with over 19,000 respondents conducted in Japan in 2012 to address some of  these 
challenges. By focusing on the survey’s evidence on emergency drinking water, the paper studies a form of  
disaster preparedness in which (i) government provides in-kind rather than cash relief, (ii) public and 
self-insurance are essentially perfect substitutes, and (iii) public and self-insurance exhaust the pool of  
effective risk management options. Such a setting provides a conducive environment in which to observe 
possible crowding effects of  a popular form of  governmental relief  and to measure a close approximation 
to the total impact of  a crowding mechanism, if  present.  
We find little evidence for crowing out at a meaningful scale. Evidence for both the preparedness status 
and the propensity to store some positive amount of  EDW is consistent with the hypothesis that there are 
no crowding effects and that variations in preparedness status are driven by demographics. At the 
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intensive margin, there is statistically robust evidence among underprepared households that their shortfall 
of  private EDW storage below official guidelines is higher when government stores more EDW, but 
crowding out is around 2 percent. This negligible impact stands in contrast to evidence the impact of  cash 
relief  and could be driven by the in-kind character of  public EDW. This is a question that deserves further 
attention.  
Apart from crowding out, our results highlight the particular importance of  dependent household 
member in determining shortfall in preparedness: While households with dependents are marginally more 
likely to take some preparation, these preparations fall short of  the requirements by at least half. This 
suggests that targeted supply of  public EDW to these households is likely to have disproportionate impact. 
In sum, the present paper adds evidence on how non-hypothetical self-insurance behavior by households 
responds to in-kind relief  by government. This evidence weighs heavily in the direction that in these 
contexts, crowding out effects, if  present at all, are insubstantial.  
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Appendix A 
Table A.1: Prefecture-level regression for share of  households with positive EDW storage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public EDW -0.000242 -0.000649 0.000869 0.00126 0.00120 0.00281* 
 (0.00191) (0.00174) (0.00227) (0.00173) (0.00170) (0.00139) 
EX_Disaster 
  
-0.267 
  
-0.183 
 
  
(0.423) 
  
(0.264) 
EX_Shelter 
  
0.621 
  
0.545 
 
  
(0.558) 
  
(0.351) 
EX_Kobe 
  
0.120 
  
-0.0539 
 
  
(0.287) 
  
(0.173) 
EX_Tohoku 
  
0.152 
  
0.187** 
 
  
(0.145) 
  
(0.0863) 
Expenditure  
 
1.159 
   
-13.26 
 
 
(12.67) 
   
(9.841) 
Professionals 
 
-0.140*** 
   
-0.0401 
 
 
(0.0461) 
   
(0.0341) 
Training 
   
0.692*** 
 
0.467** 
 
   
(0.225) 
 
(0.178) 
Compliance 
   
0.598** 
 
0.529** 
 
   
(0.293) 
 
(0.195) 
Density 
    
0.0191 0.0171 
     
(0.0156) (0.0107) 
Education 
    
-0.00120 -0.00778 
     
(0.0537) (0.0356) 
Income 
    
0.000873** 0.000754*** 
     
(0.000343) (0.000244) 
Children 
    
0.430 0.265 
     
(0.322) (0.221) 
Elderlies 
    
-0.562 -0.785** 
     
(0.480) (0.348) 
Constant 0.576*** 0.653*** 0.540*** 0.294*** 0.0284 -0.0614 
 
(0.0182) (0.0282) (0.0332) (0.0957) (0.251) (0.190) 
       Observations 47 47 47 47 47 47 
R-squared 0.000 0.210 0.155 0.252 0.340 0.784 
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 
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F 0.0162 3.806 1.510 4.842 3.435 8.320 
Note: Dependent variable is the share of  households in the prefecture that store a positive amount of  EDW. Significance levels are * p < 0.10, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table A.2: Prefecture-level regression run for average shortfall in EDW preparedness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public EDW 0.00301 0.00170 -0.0130 -0.00126 -0.00708 -0.0149 
 (0.0452) (0.0385) (0.0567) (0.0474) (0.0374) (0.0376) 
EX_Disaster 
  
4.090 
  
2.078 
 
  
(10.58) 
  
(7.139) 
EX_Shelter 
  
-4.141 
  
-9.649 
 
  
(13.94) 
  
(9.513) 
EX_Kobe 
  
-4.010 
  
0.216 
 
  
(7.170) 
  
(4.692) 
EX_Tohoku 
  
-3.620 
  
-4.336* 
 
  
(3.619) 
  
(2.338) 
Expenditure  
 
183.1 
   
715.5** 
 
 
(280.1) 
   
(266.5) 
Professionals 
 
1.778 
   
-0.241 
 
 
(1.080) 
   
(0.923) 
Training 
 
-0.924*** 
   
-0.734** 
 
 
(0.334) 
   
(0.289) 
Compliance 
   
-2.397 
 
-5.614 
 
   
(6.158) 
 
(4.834) 
Density 
   
-0.972 
 
5.100 
    
(8.022) 
 
(5.284) 
Education 
    
-1.758 -1.045 
     
(1.161) (0.965) 
Income 
    
-0.00391 0.00387 
     
(0.00722) (0.00662) 
Children 
    
6.640 8.870 
     
(7.040) (5.983) 
Elderlies 
    
42.67*** 41.26*** 
     
(10.23) (9.415) 
Constant 17.31*** 16.77*** 17.43*** 17.94*** 24.09*** 15.91*** 
 
(0.433) (0.771) (0.831) (2.621) (5.192) (5.154) 
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       Observations 47 47 47 47 47 47 
R-squared 0.000 0.336 0.063 0.004 0.420 0.719 
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 
F 0.00443 5.303 0.555 0.0591 5.943 5.860 
r . . . . . . 
r2_a -0.0221 0.272 -0.0509 -0.0654 0.350 0.597 
corr . . . . . . 
rank 2 5 6 4 6 15 
Note: Dependent variable is the average shortfall in EDW by households below official guidelines in the prefecture. Significance 
levels are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Appendix B 
Table B.1: Effects after ordered probit – Elevated EDW threshold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public EDW -0.00410*** -0.00393*** -0.00438*** -0.00349** -0.00136 -0.000685 
 (0.00153) (0.00143) (0.00163) (0.00146) (0.00102) (0.000982) 
Density     6.32e-05*** 6.85e-05*** 
     (1.71e-05) (1.54e-05) 
High school     0.110*** 0.1000*** 
     (0.0374) (0.0375) 
Tertiary education     0.156*** 0.149*** 
     (0.0393) (0.0393) 
Graduate education     0.103** 0.0901** 
     (0.0449) (0.0454) 
Income     0.000260*** 0.000217*** 
     (2.56e-05) (2.62e-05) 
One Child     0.0247 0.0635** 
     (0.0313) (0.0309) 
Two Children     -0.158*** -0.102** 
     (0.0424) (0.0419) 
Three Children     -0.363*** -0.348** 
     (0.138) (0.139) 
Four Children     -4.797*** -4.599*** 
     (0.223) (0.225) 
Elderlies     0.00838 -0.0192 
     (0.0428) (0.0436) 
EX_Disaster   0.154***   0.141*** 
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   (0.0295)   (0.0237) 
EX_Shelter   0.105***   0.0788*** 
   (0.0258)   (0.0215) 
EX_Kobe   -0.0678   0.0409 
   (0.0714)   (0.0501) 
EX_Tohoku   0.137   0.340*** 
   (0.104)   (0.0809) 
Expenditure  2.566    -10.34 
  (14.20)    (9.384) 
Professionals  -0.139***    -0.0682*** 
  (0.0351)    (0.0180) 
Training    0.310***  0.301*** 
    (0.0323)  (0.0313) 
Compliance    0.273***  0.253*** 
    (0.0175)  (0.0198) 
Constant cut1 -0.386*** -0.430*** -0.346*** -0.251*** 0.0274 0.156** 
 (0.0719) (0.0745) (0.0797) (0.0738) (0.0633) (0.0657) 
Constant cut2 1.339*** 1.302*** 1.386*** 1.503*** 1.783*** 1.951*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0535) (0.0622) (0.0571) (0.0585) (0.0573) 
       
Observations 19,071 19,071 19,071 19,071 19,000 19,000 
Note: Dependent variable is the preparedness status of  the household (unprepared = 1, underprepared = 2, prepared 
= 3) based on EDW requirements that are 25 percent higher than under official guidelines. Standard errors clustered 
at prefecture level. Significance levels are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table B.2: Effects after ordered probit – Reduced EDW threshold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public EDW -0.00437*** -0.00419*** -0.00469*** -0.00372*** -0.00159 -0.000951 
 (0.00150) (0.00140) (0.00160) (0.00143) (0.00104) (0.00100) 
Density     6.16e-05*** 6.60e-05*** 
     (1.75e-05) (1.59e-05) 
High school     0.0920*** 0.0817** 
     (0.0321) (0.0323) 
Tertiary education     0.138*** 0.131*** 
     (0.0331) (0.0331) 
Graduate education     0.0964** 0.0831* 
     (0.0427) (0.0428) 
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Income     0.000289*** 0.000244*** 
     (2.13e-05) (2.24e-05) 
One Child     -0.0512** -0.0139 
     (0.0253) (0.0248) 
Two Children     -0.171*** -0.114** 
     (0.0462) (0.0459) 
Three Children     -0.357** -0.335** 
     (0.153) (0.155) 
Four Children     -4.730*** -4.528*** 
     (0.226) (0.229) 
Elderlies     0.00113 -0.0274 
     (0.0432) (0.0451) 
EX_Disaster   0.160***   0.149*** 
   (0.0334)   (0.0290) 
EX_Shelter   0.111***   0.0859*** 
   (0.0284)   (0.0236) 
EX_Kobe   -0.0893   0.0133 
   (0.0721)   (0.0565) 
EX_Tohoku   0.134   0.337*** 
   (0.108)   (0.0874) 
Expenditure  1.990    -12.26 
  (14.65)    (9.510) 
Professionals  -0.147***    -0.0758*** 
  (0.0336)    (0.0171) 
Training    0.325***  0.312*** 
    (0.0360)  (0.0355) 
Compliance    0.276***  0.253*** 
    (0.0161)  (0.0171) 
Constant cut1 -0.387*** -0.433*** -0.346*** -0.248*** 0.0201 0.145** 
 (0.0719) (0.0742) (0.0798) (0.0716) (0.0618) (0.0638) 
Constant cut2 0.762*** 0.722*** 0.808*** 0.922*** 1.192*** 1.345*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0600) (0.0681) (0.0582) (0.0594) (0.0596) 
       
Observations 19,071 19,071 19,071 19,071 19,000 19,000 
Note: Dependent variable is the preparedness status of  the household (unprepared = 1, underprepared = 2, prepared 
= 3) based on EDW requirements that are 25 percent lower than under official guidelines. Standard errors clustered at 
prefecture level. Significance levels are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
